This paper studies non-cooperative games where players are allowed to play their mixed non-additive strategies. Expected payoffs are expressed by so-called fuzzy integrals: Choquet integral, Sugeno integral and generalizations of Sugeno integral obtained by using triangular norms. We consider the existence problem of Nash equilibrium for such games. Positive results for Sugeno integral and its generalizations are obtained. However we provide some example of a game with Choquet payoffs which have no Nash equilibrium. Such example demonstrates that fuzzy integrals based on the maximum operation are more suitable for possibility capacities then Choquet integral which is based on the addition operation.
Introduction
The classical Nash equilibrium theory is based on fixed point theory and was developed in frames of linear convexity. The mixed strategies of a player are probability (additive) measures on a set of pure strategies. But an interest to Nash equilibria in more general frames is rapidly growing in last decades. For instance, Aliprantis, Florenzano and Tourky [2] work in ordered topological vector spaces, Luo [21] in topological semilattices, Vives [32] in complete lattices. Briec and Horvath [4] proved existence of Nash equilibrium point for idempotent convexity.
We can use additive measures only when we know precisely probabilities of all events considered in a game. However, it is not a case in many modern economic models. The decision theory under uncertainty considers a model when probabilities of states are either not known or imprecisely specified. Gilboa [16] and Schmeidler [28] axiomatized expectations expressed by Choquet integrals attached to non-additive measures called capacities (fuzzy measures), as a formal approach to decision-making under uncertainty.
Dow and Werlang [10] used this approach for two players game where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player is a convex capacity, but the players play with pure strategies. They introduced some equilibrium notion for such games and proved its existence. This result was extended onto games with arbitrary finite number of players in [14] . Another interesting approach to the games in convex capacities with pay-off functions expressed by Choquet integrals can be find in [22] . The authors considered finite sets of pure strategies in the above mentioned papers.
An alternative to so-called Choquet expected utility model is the qualitative decision theory. The corresponding expected utility is expressed by Sugeno integral. This approach was widely studied in the last decade ( [11] , [12] , [8] , [27] ). Sugeno integral chooses a median value of utilities which is qualitative counterpart of the averaging operation by Choquet integral.
The equilibrium notion from [10] and [14] for a game with expected payoff function defined by Sugeno integral was considered in [25] . The sets of pure strategies are arbitrarily compacta. Let us remark that in [10] and [14] attention was restricted to convex capacities which play an important role in Choquet expected utility theory. There are two important classes of capacities in the qualitative decision theory, namely possibility and necessity capacities which describe optimistic and pessimistic criteria [11] . The existence of equilibrium expressed by possibility (or necessity) capacities is proved in [25] . Since the spaces of possibility and necessity capacities have no natural linear convex structure, some non-linear convexity is used.
Kozhan and Zarichnyi [20] and Glycopantis and Muir [17] considered games with Choquet payoff where players are allowed to form non-additive beliefs about opponent's decision but also to play their mixed non-additive strategies expressed by capacities. The same approach for games with Sugeno payoff was considered in [24] . Games with strategies expressed by possibility capacities were recently considered by Hosni and Marchioni [18] . They considered payoff functions represented by Choquet integral and Sugeno integral. Let us remark that when we consider the space of all capacities which has the greatest and the smallest elements (or the space of possibility capacities which has the greatest elements), then the existence problem of Nash equilibrium is rather trivial. But the set of possibility capacities has no smallest element and the set of necessity capacities has no greatest element. So, if we consider a game where the players play their mixed strategies expressed by possibility capacities and the goal of each player is to minimize his expected payoff function, existence of Nash equilibrium is not trivial for such games. (Dually, it is possible to consider games in necessity capacities and the goal to maximize expected payoff function.) We will prove existence of Nash equilibrium for games with expected payoff function represented by fuzzy integral generated by the maximum operation and some continuous triangular norm (a partial case is the Sugeno integral which is generated by the maximum and the minimum operations). We also provide an example of a game in possibility capacities with minimizing of expected payoff function represented by Choquet integral which has no Nash equilibrium. This example demonstrates that the Choquet integral is not so suitable for possibility capacities as it is for convex capacities (see for example [10] , [14] and [22] ).
Capacities and fuzzy integrals
In what follows, all spaces are assumed to be compacta (compact Hausdorff space) except for R and all maps are assumed to be continuous. By F (X) we denote the family of all closed subsets of a compactum X. We shall denote the Banach space of continuous functions on a compactum X endowed with the supnorm by C(X). For any c ∈ R we shall denote the constant function on X taking the value c by c X . We also consider natural lattice operations ∨ and ∧ on C(X) and its sublattices C(X, [0, +∞)) and C(X, [0, 1]).
We need the definition of capacity on a compactum X. We follow a terminology of [23] . A function ν : F (X) → [0, 1] is called an upper-semicontinuous capacity on X if the three following properties hold for each closed subsets F and G of X:
If F is a one-point set we use a simpler notation ν(a) instead ν({a}). A capacity ν is extended in [23] to all open subsets U ⊂ X by the formula ν(U ) = sup{ν(K) | K is a closed subset of X such that K ⊂ U }.
It was proved in [23] that the space M X of all upper-semicontinuous capacities on a compactum X is a compactum as well, if a topology on M X is defined by a subbase that consists of all sets of the form 1] . Since all capacities we consider here are upper-semicontinuous, in the following we call elements of M X simply capacities.
A capacity ν ∈ M X for a compactum X is called a necessity (possibility) capac-
(See [33] for more details.) We denote by M ∩ X (M ∪ X) a subspace of M X consisting of all necessity (possibility) capacities. Since X is compact and ν is uppersemicontinuous, ν ∈ M ∩ X iff ν satisfy the simpler requirement that ν(A ∩ B) = min{ν(A), ν(B)}.
If ν is a capacity on a compactum X, then the function κX(ν), that is defined on the family F (X) by the formula κX(ν)(F ) = 1 − ν(X \ F ), is a capacity as well. It is called the dual capacity (or conjugate capacity ) to ν. The mapping κX : M X → M X is a homeomorphism and an involution [23] . Moreover, ν is a necessity capacity if and only if κX(ν) is a possibility capacity. This implies in particular that ν ∈ M ∪ X iff ν satisfy the simpler requirement that ν(A ∪ B) = max{ν(A), ν(B)}. It is easy to check that M ∩ X and M ∪ X are closed subsets of M X.
The notion of density for an idempotent measure was introduced in [1] . For each possibility capacity ν ∈ M ∪ X we consider an upper semicontinuous function [ν] : X → [0, 1] that sends each x ∈ X to ν(x) and is called the density of ν. Observe that for a possibility capacity ν ∈ M ∪ X and a closed set F ⊂ X we have ν(F ) = max{ν(x)|x ∈ F }, and ν is completely determined by its values on singletons. It means that ν is completely determined by the function [ν]. Conversely, each upper semicontinuous function f : X → I with max f = 1 determines a possibility capacity (f ) ∈ M ∪ X by the formula (f )(F ) = max{f (x)|x ∈ F }, for a closed subset F of X. It is easy to check that ([ν]) = ν for each ν ∈ M ∪ X and [(f )] = f for each upper semicontinuous function f : X → I with max f = 1.
Denote ϕ t = ϕ −1 ([t, +∞)) for each ϕ ∈ C(X, [0, +∞)) and t ∈ [0, +∞). Let us remind definitions of the Choquet integral and the Sugeno integral with respect to a capacity µ ∈ M X. We consider for a compactum X and for a function f ∈ C(X, [0, +∞)) an integral defined by the formula [9] and call it the Choquet integral.
For a function f ∈ C(X, [0, 1]) we consider an integral defined by the formula [30] and call it the Sugeno integral. The existence of maximum follows from the semicontinuity of the capacity µ.
Let us remark that the operation of minimum ∧ is an important example of triangular norm (t-norm). Remind that triangular norm * is a binary operation on the closed unit interval [0, 1] which is associative, commutative, monotone and s * 1 = s for each s ∈ [0, 1] [19] . We consider only continuous t-norms in this paper. Integrals obtained by changing the operation ∧ in the definition of Sugeno integral by any t-norm are called t-normed integrals and were studied in [34] , [35] and [29] . So, for a continuous t-norm * and a function f ∈ C(X, [0, 1]) the corresponding t-normed integral is defined by the formula
Let us remark that a constant function is comonotone to any function ψ ∈ C(X, [0, 1]).
). The proof of the following lemma is based on a routine construction.
Consider a characterization theorem of Sugeno integral for functions and capacities on finite X proved in [6] . It is proved in [6] that for a finite compactum X a non-negative functional µ on C(X, [0, 1]) = [0, 1] X satisfies the conditions:
if and only if there exists a unique capacity ν such that µ is the Sugeno integral with respect to ν.
The analogous characterization theorem was proved in [7] for each t-normed integral on a finite compactum. The authors also posed the problem to extend above mentioned results to any (infinite) compacta. We will consider such generalization in this section.
We consider any compactum X and a continuous t-norm * .
Proof. Put a = min x∈X f (x) and b = max x∈X f (x). The we have
We denote by B the set of functionals µ : C(X, [0, 1]) → [0, 1] which satisfy the conditions:
Let us remark that for each c ∈ [0, 1] and for each µ ∈ B the equality µ(c X ) = c follows from Properties 1 and 4.
and only if there exists a unique capacity ν such that µ is the t-normed integral with respect to ν.
Proof. Sufficiency. Consider any capacity ν ∈ M X. By µ we denote the the t-normed integral with respect to ν. Then µ satisfies Property 1 by Lemma 3. Consider any functions ϕ, ψ ∈ C(X) such that ϕ ≤ ψ. The inequality µ(ϕ) ≤ µ(ψ) follows from the obvious inclusion ϕ t ⊂ ψ t and monotonicity of t-norm.
Let ϕ, ψ ∈ C(X, [0, 1]) be two comonotone functions. The inequality µ(ψ ∨ ϕ) ≥ µ(ψ) ∨ µ(ϕ) follows from Property 2 proved above. We have ν
Consider any c ∈ R and ψ ∈ C(X).
Choose t 0 ∈ [0, 1] such that µ(ψ) = ν(ψ −1 ([t 0 , 1])) * t 0 . Since * is monotone, we have (c * ψ) c * t0 ⊃ ψ t0 and ν(c * ψ) c * t0 ) * c * t 0 ≥ ν(ψ t0 ) * t 0 * c = µ(ψ) * c. We proved Property 4. Hence µ ∈ B.
Necessity. Take any µ ∈ B. Define ν : F (X) → [0, 1] as follows ν(A) = inf{µ(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ Υ A } if A = ∅ and ν(∅) = 0. It is easy to see that ν satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 from the definition of capacity.
Let ν(A) < η for some η ∈ [0, 1] and A ∈ F (X). Then there exists ϕ ∈ Υ A such that µ(ϕ) < η. Choose β ∈ I such that µ(ϕ) < β < η. Since the operation * is continuous, η * 1 = η and η * 0 = 0, there is δ ∈ I such that η * δ = β. Evidently, δ < 1. Choose ζ ∈ I such that δ < ζ < 1 and a function ψ
Let us show that ∨ * X ϕdν = µ(ϕ) for each ϕ ∈ C(X, I). We have
Put m = max x∈X ϕ(x). Then for each t ∈ [0, m] there exists χ t ∈ Υ ϕt such that µ(t * χ t ) < a. Consider any t < m. We can assume that χ t is comonotone with ϕ by Lemma 2. Choose t ′ > t such that
Then we have m * λ * χ m * λ ≤ b < λ * a. Hence m * χ m * λ < a. Since m * λ * χ m * λ ≤ b < λ * a, we obtain ϕ −1 (m) ⊂ Int(m * χ m * λ ) −1 (m) = V m * λ . The the open cover {V t | t ≤ m} has a finite subcover {V t0 , . . . , V t k }. We can assume that t 0 = m * λ and t i ∈ [0, m)\{t 0 } for i > 0. Put t ′ 0 = m. Then we have that the functions t ′ i * χ ti are pairwise comonotone, hence µ(max k i=0 {t ′ i * χ ti }) < a. On the other hand ϕ ≤ max k i=0 {t ′ i * χ ti } and we obtain a contradiction.
For ψ ∈ C(X, [0, 1]) we define a function l ψ X : M X → [0, 1] by the formula l ψ X (ν) = ∨ * X ψdν. We also define a map l X : M X → [0, 1] C(X,[0,1]) taking the diagonal product l X = (l ψ X ) ψ∈C(X,[0,1]) .
Lemma 4. The map l ψ X is continuous for each ψ ∈ C(X, [0, 1]).
Proof. Consider any ν ∈ M X such that l ψ X (ν) < a for some a ∈ (0, 1]. Put ε = a − l ψ X (ν). Since the map * :
Hence l ψ X (µ) < a. Now, consider any ν ∈ M X such that l ψ X (ν) > a for some a ∈ [0, 1). Then there exists t ∈ [0, 1] such that ν(ψ t ) * t > a. Put ε = ν(ψ t ) * t − a. As before we choose δ > 0 such that for each (r 1 , r 2 ), (p 1 , p 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] such that |r 1 − p 1 | < δ and |r 2 − p 2 | < δ we have |r 1 * r
Hence l ψ X (µ) > a and the map l ψ X is continuous.
The map l X is a topological embedding.
Tensor products of capacities
For a continuous map of compacta f :
The map M f is continuous. In fact, this extension of the construction M defines the capacity functor in the category of compacta and continuous maps. The categorical technics are very useful for investigation of capacities on compacta (see [23] for more details). We try to avoid the formalism of category theory in this paper, but we follow the main ideas of such approach.
The tensor product operation of probability measures is well known and very useful partially for investigation of the spaces of probability measures on compacta (see for example Chapter 8 from [15] ). General categorical definition of tensor product for any functor was given in [3] . Applying this definition to the capacity functor we obtain that the tensor product of capacities on compacta X 1 and X 2 is a continuous map
A tensor product for capacities was introduced in [20] . This definition is based on the capacity monad structure. An explicit formula for evaluating tensor product of capacities was given in [25] omitting the formalism of category theory. For
The problem of multiplication of capacities was deeply considered in the possibility theory and it application to the game theory and the decision making theory where the term joint possibility distribution is used. A standard choice of a joint possibility distribution is based on the minimum operation. For
(Let us remind that by [ν] we denote the density of a possibility capacity ν.) It is easy to check that both definitions coincide in the class of possibility capacities, the difference is only in terms.
A more general approach is also used where the minimum operation is changed by any t-norm (see for example [13] ). We will use this definition in our paper but we prefer the term tensor product.
So, we fix a continuous t-norm * and consider a tensor product generated by * defined as follows. For possibility capacities µ 1 ∈ M ∪ X 1 , µ 2 ∈ M ∪ X 2 and (x, y) ∈ X 1 × X 2 we put
We also can generalize the above mentioned formula from [25] . For capacities µ 1 ∈ M X 1 , µ 2 ∈ M X 2 and B ∈ F (X 1 × X 2 ) we put
The following theorem shows that both definitions coincide in the class of possibility capacities.
Proof. We have
Hence It was noticed in [20] that we can extend the definition of tensor product to any finite number of factors by induction.
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
Let us recall the notion of Nash equilibrium and some facts concerning existence of such equilibrium. We consider an n-players game f : X = n j=1 X j → R n with compact Hausdorff spaces of strategies X i . The coordinate function f i : X → R is called the payoff function of i-th player. For x ∈ X and t i ∈ X i we use the notation (x; t i ) = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , t i , x i+1 , . . . , x n ). A point x ∈ X is called a Nash max-equilibrium (min-equilibrium) point if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for each
Usually some additional convexity structures are needed to establish existence of Nash equilibrium. A family C of closed subsets of a compactum X is called a convexity on X if C is stable for intersection and contains X and the empty set. The elements of C are called C-convex (or simply convex). Although we follow general concept of abstract convexity from [31] , our definition is different. We consider only closed convex sets. Such structure is called a closure structure in [31] . Our definition is the same as in [36] . The whole family of convex sets in the sense of [31] could be obtained by the operation of union of up-directed families. In what follows, we assume that each convexity contains all singletons.
A convexity C on X is called T 4 (normal) if for each disjoint C 1 , C 2 ∈ C there exist S 1 , S 2 ∈ C such that S 1 ∪ S 2 = X, C 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ and C 2 ∩ S 1 = ∅ (see for example [26] ).
Now, let C i be a convexity on X i . We say that a function f i :
[24] Let f : X = n j=1 X j → R n be a game with a normal convexity C i defined on each compactum X i such that all convex sets are connected, the function f is continuous and the function f i : X → R is quasiconcave (quasiconvex) with respect to the i-th variable for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there exists a Nash maxequilibrium (min-equilibrium) point.
Let us remark that the previous theorem was proved in [24] only for the maxequilibrium. But the proof is the same for the min-equilibrium. Now we apply these general concepts to the spaces of possibility capacities. We consider a game u : Z = n i=1 Z i → [0, 1] n with compact Hausdorff spaces of pure strategies Z 1 , . . . , Z n and continuous payoff functions 1] . Let ⋆ and * be two t-norms. We will extend the game u : Z = n i=1 Z i → [0, 1] n to a game in mixed strategies eu : n i=1 M ∪ Z i → [0, 1] n using the integral generated by t-norm ⋆ and the tensor product generated by t-norm * .
We define expected payoff functions eu i : n j=1 M ∪ Z j → [0, 1] by the formula
for (ν 1 , . . . , ν n ) ∈ n j=1 M ∪ Z j . Lemma 4 and continuity of tensor product imply the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The function eu i is continuous for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We discuss existence of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies represented by possibility capacities. There exist a trivial solution of the problem for max-equilibrium. We can consider the natural order on M ∪ Z i . Then each M ∪ Z i contains the greatest element µ i defined by the formula
for A ∈ F (Z i ). Hence (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) is a Nash max-equilibrium point. There is no such trivial solution for the min-equilibrium, since M ∪ Z i does not contain the smallest element. We will need some convexity structure on M ∪ X to establish existence of the min-equilibrium. We use an idempotent convexity considered in [4] and [5] for finite-dimensional spaces where it was called B-convexity. Firstly, we introduce it on a cube [0, 1] S , where S is any set (finite or infinite). We call a subset C of [0, 1] S B-convex if for each x, y ∈ [0, 1] S and α ∈ [0, 1] we have α·x∨y ∈ C (the operations of maximum ∨ and multiplication for a scalar · are taken coordinate-wise).
Partially, we can consider B-convexity on M ∪ X for each compactum X. Take
It is easy to check that s · ν ∨ µ ∈ M ∪ X. It is also easy to see that the introduced operation commutes with taking the density, i.e.
[ν] and [µ] as elements of [0, 1] X . We call a subset C of M ∪ X B-convex if for each ν, µ ∈ M ∪ X and s ∈ [0, 1] we have s · ν ∨ µ ∈ C. Evidently, each B-convex set is connected. So, we consider on M ∪ X a convexity structure C X which consists of all closed B-convex subsets of M ∪ X.
The proof of the following lemma reduces to routine checking and so we omit it. Proof. Let A and D be two B-convex disjoint closed subsets of M ∪ X. Then l X (A) and l X (D) are two B-convex disjoint closed subsets of [0, 1] C(X,[0,1]) by Lemma 6 and Corollary 1. It follows from compactness of l X (A) and l X (D) and properties of the product topology on [0, 1] C(X,[0,1]) that there exists a finite subset N of C(X, [0, 1]) such that p N (l X (A)) ∩ p N (l X (D)) = ∅ where p N : [0, 1] C(X,[0,1]) → [0, 1] N is the natural projection. Evidently p N (l X (A)) and p N (l X (D)) are B-convex disjoint compact subsets of R N . Theorem 7.1 from [5] implies that there exist two B-convex closed subsets L 1 , L 2 of [0, 1] N such that L 1 ∪ L 2 = [0, 1] N and L 1 ∩ p N (l X (B)) = ∅ = L 2 ∩ p N (l X (A)). Then (p N • l X ) −1 (L 1 ) and (p N • l X ) −1 (L 2 ) are B-convex closed subsets of M ∪ X we are looking for.
Let us remark that each t-norm is distributive respectively the maximum operation, i.e. t * (s ∨ l) = (t * s) ∨ (t * l). It follows from the monotonicity property. Proof. We will prove the lemma for the case n = 2. The proof of the general case is the same. We also can assume i = 1. Consider any s ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ M ∪ Z 2 .
We should show that (eu µ 1 ) −1 ([0, s]) is B-convex. Consider any capacities ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ M ∪ Z 1 , such that eu 1 (ν j , µ) ≤ s for each j ∈ {1, 2}.
Choose any c ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have
Theorem 3 and Lemmas 7, 8 imply the following theorem. 
